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Executive summary 
 
Background and aims of the project 
In April 2013, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act was enacted. Section 97 of 
the Act requires government to introduce a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination into British equality law by making caste ‘an aspect of’ the protected 
characteristic of race in the Equality Act 2010. In light of this, the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) contracted a team of academics drawn from different 
research institutions to conduct an independent study in two parts:  
 
• a review of existing socio-legal research on British equality law and caste; and  
 
• two supporting events (for experts and stakeholders).  
 
This report (Dhanda et al, 2014a) details the findings from the first part of the study 
and is best read alongside the report of the experts’ seminar and stakeholders’ 
workshop (Dhanda et al, 2014b). 
 
Methodology 
The review of socio-legal research was conducted between October and December 
2013. Desk research was undertaken to provide a detailed review of existing legal 
research literature on caste and the law in Britain and internationally. As well as 
academic works, this included ‘grey’ literature. Case reports, court and tribunal 
judgments, legislation (including commentaries and explanatory notes), and 
academic commentaries on legislation and caselaw were also reviewed.  
 
The material gathered was analysed and used to inform both this report and to 
prepare the questions for participants invited to attend the experts’ seminar and the 
later stakeholders’ workshop (see Dhanda et al, 2014b). The deliberations at these 
events, together with the subsequent discussions with legal experts and the written 
statements from the seminar, fed into this review. 
 
Main findings 
 
The meaning of caste and its manifestations in Britain  
Caste is a form of identity that is used as a basis for social differentiation and usually 
involves inequality. It is generally accepted that caste is acquired by birth and 
sustained by endogamy, in which marriage is restricted to individuals of the same 
caste. Caste has considerable fluidity and also a global reach. In Britain, caste is 
positively a form of association and social capital among communities of South Asian 
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origin, but negatively a form of social separation, distinction and ranking. In 
predominant usage in Britain, caste is used interchangeably for varna, jati, and 
biradari. The most typical usage, though, is of caste as jati.  
 
Varna, the four-fold division of Indic populations, is widely used in Sanskrit texts: 
Brahmin (priest), Kshatriya (warrior and ruler), Vaishya (trader or producer) and 
Shudra (servant, labourer). Varna is considered by some as hierarchical and by 
others as a classification of functions only. Excluded from the varna system, 
comprising a fifth category, are the Dalits, formerly known as ‘Untouchables’. Dalit is 
a political term of self-identification adopted by many, but not all, persons of so-called 
‘Untouchable’ origin. It embraces a variety of distinct castes, the names of which 
individuals may or may not choose to use, but which when used by others may be 
regarded as offensive. 
 
The second meaning of caste is rendered by the South Asian term jati. Jatis are not 
fixed units and may be divided into ‘sub-castes’ which are the socially significant 
identities and status groups. Unlike varna, the concept of jati is not connected to any 
one religious grouping, but is found in all the major South Asian religious 
communities.  
 
Finally, caste encompasses biradari (brotherhood), also referred to by the term zaat, 
used interchangeably with biradari or in combination with it (zaat-biradari). Zaat is in 
turn related to ‘nasal’ (lineage), meaning race. 
 
As a form of social identification, caste is distinct from class, race, and various forms 
of ethnicity. Caste and race have long been interlinked, but caste hierarchy cannot 
have originated in social gradations based on skin colour.  
 
Academics writing on caste in the UK present it as dynamic, but having resilient 
features of social distinctions between caste groups. There is a potential for caste-
based conflict to be masked as religious conflict. Research shows that caste is also 
manifest within new youth culture including music and social media. 
 
Caste and protected characteristics 
The Equality Act 2010 prohibits specified types of conduct or behaviour, in specified 
spheres of activity and because of certain protected characteristics only. Conduct 
must meet all three criteria in order to amount to actionable discrimination. For 
example, under the Equality Act, discrimination which is not in a regulated sphere, or 
which is not because of a protected characteristic, is not unlawful. Legally regulated 
fields include employment but do not include the private sphere, such as marriage. 
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Prohibited types of conduct can be direct or indirect discrimination, harassment or 
victimisation, which have relatively high standards of proof.  
 
Section 97 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 requires that caste be 
made ‘an aspect of’ the protected characteristic of race in the Equality Act 2010, not 
a protected characteristic in itself. It does not indicate how this is to be achieved, 
meaning it is open to deem caste to form part of an existing sub-category of race; or 
to name caste as a specific sub-category (with colour, nationality, national and ethnic 
origins). Until caste is introduced into legislation, legal protection against caste 
discrimination depends on establishing in the courts that caste is subsumed within an 
existing characteristic. Of the nine protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010 
only race, and religion or belief, contend as possible ‘legal homes’ for caste. 
 
Caste as a characteristic is distinct from religion or belief. Caste discrimination is 
motivated by the known or perceived caste status of the victim, not the religion or 
belief to which the victim is known or thought to subscribe to, and it is therefore 
misconceived to conflate caste status with religious identity.  
 
There are, however, situations where caste has been said to be subsumed under the 
protected characteristic of religion. Prohibitions on discrimination connected with 
religion or belief provisions may be relied on in cases of caste discrimination where 
the victim is a member of a religious group whose members are seen as largely of 
one caste or sub-caste such as the Ravidassias or Valmikis; hence religion and caste 
overlap sufficiently for the religion provisions to be relied on even though the 
discrimination may be in whole or in part because of caste. Nevertheless, using 
religious discrimination provisions masks rather than exposes the caste-based nature 
of the discrimination. Alternatively, where discrimination is because of religion and 
caste, the religion or belief provisions may be relied on where religion is a significant 
even if not the only reason for the discriminatory treatment. 
 
Race as currently defined in the Equality Act 2010 includes four aspects: colour, 
nationality, and national or ethnic origins, with ethnic origins potentially open to 
interpretation as including caste. Sociological literature shows that caste groups do 
not correspond to culturally, linguistically or historically coherent groups defined by 
reference to the legal meaning of ethnic origins. Following international law, it could 
be argued that because ‘descent’ has been interpreted to include caste at the 
international level, so it could be said to include caste at the domestic level; but this 
involves a number of interpretative leaps. In 2012, in the first case in which a 
decision has been reached where the meaning of caste for the purposes of existing 
discrimination legislation has been examined, it was held that caste in that particular 
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case could not be subsumed under ethnic origins. However, in a subsequent case in 
January 2014, an employment tribunal reached a different decision. It held that race 
in the Equality Act 2010 could, in the context of that case, be construed as providing 
for caste discrimination to be part of the protected characteristic of race 
discrimination. 
 
Caste and exceptions 
The Equality Act 2010 lists a number of exceptions, including a Genuine 
Occupational Requirement where an employer can apply, in relation to work, a 
requirement to have a particular protected characteristic. The test is set high and an 
employer would have to meet these standards in order to defend successfully a 
requirement that an employee has a particular protected characteristic. Caste is not 
yet an aspect of the protected characteristic of race in the Act, but it is expected that 
when it is included, the question of whether the existing exceptions are adequate, or 
whether specific exceptions are required to deal with caste, will be addressed. Being 
of a particular religious belief can also be a Genuine Occupational Requirement in 
the case of employers with an ethos based on religion or belief, which may be 
established by reference to such evidence as the organisation’s founding 
constitution. The ‘religious organisations’ exception would allow, for example, a 
Valmiki organisation to restrict key posts to Valmikis.  
 
Further exceptions apply to services, in which it is possible to provide services 
generally used by groups who share a protected characteristic, including race, 
although to deny services and to dispose of premises on the basis of race is not 
permitted. This allows preferences to be shown on the basis of protected 
characteristics such as sex or religion, but not on the basis of race. A general 
exception in relation to organisations based on religion or belief provides for 
restrictions on membership and other allowable constraints, but does not extend to 
race, this means that, for example, a Ravidassia organisation which meets the 
criteria of a religious organisation may restrict its membership or the use of its 
facilities, services or premises to adherents of the Ravidassia religion, but it could not 
impose restrictions on the basis of race. In relation to education, religious exceptions 
apply to schools of a religious character, but restrictions on admissions to schools on 
the basis of race, which will include caste, are not allowed. As with the Genuine 
Occupational Requirement exception, when caste is made an aspect of race, the 
question of whether the exceptions currently applying to race should also apply to 
caste will need to be addressed. Associations, meaning groups of 25 members or 
more, as well as charities, are allowed to restrict on the basis of all protected 
characteristics, including race, with the exception of colour. Therefore caste 
associations and charities would continue to be permissible without additional 
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legislative exceptions being required, with only colour excluded from these 
exceptions.  
 
That caste is to be made an aspect of race, rather than another protected 
characteristic such as religion, means that the zone of operation of the exceptions 
generally is as narrow as it can be. There is, furthermore, a Public Sector Equality 
Duty which applies to caste as an aspect of race, whereby public bodies are required 
to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and to promote equality 
and good relationships between groups defined by reference to the various protected 
characteristics, which will include caste. However, it is widely agreed that collecting 
data on the basis of caste would be counter-productive. 
 
Overall, caste is to be made an aspect of race which can be done by interpreting 
ethnic origins to include caste, or by naming caste as a fifth sub-category of race. 
The latter approach appears to provide more clarity and fits with the wider 
understanding of the meaning of caste as distinct from ethnic origins.  
 
Caste in the international context 
The international context is relevant to caste in Britain from two perspectives. First, 
the United Nations has examined the question of caste discrimination in its 
international treaty law, finding that it is a form of descent-based discrimination and 
therefore a form of racial discrimination for the purposes of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (ICERD), to 
which the UK is a signatory. Second, the domestic systems of a number of other 
States have legislated on caste, potentially providing models for the Equality Act 
2010 as well as affirming that caste can occur outside of the South Asian context. 
Overall, the international sphere provides a benchmark against which to assess the 
current requirement contained in s.97 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013. 
 
The United Nations experience informs the present discussion. The Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), in its examination of the UK’s State 
Report under ICERD (a requirement which assesses the extent to which a State is 
implementing its treaty obligations), concluded that the inclusion of caste in the 
Equality Act 2010 was a treaty obligation. Furthermore, CERD has looked at caste 
from an international perspective, viewing it as a form of descent-based 
discrimination seen in a number of States such as India, but also in the wider South 
Asian region, for example Bangladesh, and in a small number of other States, in 
which groups suffer from discrimination which is strongly associated with caste-like 
structures. Therefore the potential application of the grounds of caste beyond the 
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South Asian paradigm could find support in the investigations of CERD at the 
international level. In addition, CERD has issued General Recommendation 29, 
which provides a definition-like description of descent-based discrimination, including 
caste and analogous systems of inherited status. It needs to be emphasised that this 
is an international understanding that requires modification for the British experience. 
Finally, ICERD affirms that caste discrimination is a form of racial discrimination. It 
supports the British legislature’s approach that caste be made an aspect of the 
protected characteristic of race.  
 
Further, the Indian Constitution underlines the notion that a periodic review is applied 
to affirmative action provisions rather than to non-discrimination grounds. The ground 
‘caste’ in the Constitution’s non-discrimination provisions is permanent. This supports 
the argument that the proposal for a review in the British legislative provision on 
caste is legally without precedent and goes against the approach of other States. 
 
However, the British formula, to treat caste as an aspect of race, more readily reflects 
the international approach in which it is considered a form of racial discrimination in 
ICERD.  
 
Conclusion 
This review examines how caste can best be made an aspect of race under the 
Equality Act 2010 and outlines why making caste an aspect of race also fits within a 
broader international context. It notes that there is an absence of an accepted legal 
standard at the domestic or international level and sets out the proposed 
characteristics of such a definition. Linked to findings of academic research on caste, 
which shows the specificity of the reproduction of caste in Britain, this review also 
suggests elements for a definition. It shows that there are dangers in adopting too 
precise, or too broad a legal definition of caste, but that there is a value in using a 
minimum definition of caste in terms of: (1) endogamy (2) inherited status, and (3) 
social stratification. 
 
Caste rules and prohibitions have always displayed strong legal characteristics, and 
clarity, thoughtfulness and sensitivity are required to articulate the meaning of caste 
in the context of the proposed legislation. This report, along with the companion 
study (Dhanda et al, 2014b), is offered as a contribution to such an articulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter first sets out the aims of the project. Second, it describes the legal 
developments that led to the duty to include caste as an aspect of race in the 
Equality Act 2010, drawing extensively on Waughray (2013). Third, it looks at the 
meaning of caste. Fourth, it provides detail on the available knowledge and current 
research on caste in Britain. Finally, it explains the methodology adopted in the 
‘Caste in Britain’ project, and sets out the scope of this report and a guide to its 
structure. 
 
1.1  Aims of the project 
In September 2013, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (the Commission) 
contracted a team of academics drawn from different research institutions to carry 
out an independent study on caste in Britain. This involved a detailed review of the 
law and caste, together with two separate invitation-only events: an experts' seminar 
and a stakeholders' workshop. This report (Dhanda et al, 2014a), constitutes the first 
part of the study; the two events are examined in Dhanda et al (2014b).  
 
The rationale for the project is the requirement contained in section 97 of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 that caste be made an aspect of race for 
the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. The aim of the report is to chart the 
background to this decision and the emergence of the issue of caste within the 
framework of British equality law. It describes the difficulties in interpreting caste 
within existing protected characteristics as currently defined. It assesses the lessons 
that can be drawn from legal approaches to caste adopted in other jurisdictions. It 
considers how caste will work as a legal concept within the Equality Act 2010.  
 
1.2 Background context 
In April 2013, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act was enacted. Section 97 of 
the Act requires government to introduce a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination into British equality law by making caste an aspect of the protected 
characteristic of race in the Equality Act 2010.  
 
Until 2005, when the then Labour Government announced a major overhaul of 
Britain’s equality framework, caste had been largely invisible as a social 
phenomenon and as a ground of discrimination. The prospect of a new, single, 
Equality Act provided a rallying point for British Dalits (see Section 1.3 for the 
meaning of this term) and a springboard for debate on the inclusion of caste in 
domestic discrimination law. In 2007, the Labour Government decided against 
including protection against caste discrimination in the Equality Bill, on the grounds 
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that there was ‘no strong evidence’ of such discrimination in Britain. During the 
passage of the Bill through Parliament in 2009-10, the government was not 
persuaded of the need to amend the Bill to include an immediate, express prohibition 
of caste discrimination.  
 
Section 9(5)(a) of the Equality Act 2010, however, allowed for discretionary 
ministerial intervention to enact legislation against caste discrimination by making 
caste ‘an aspect of’ the protected characteristic of race in section 9 of the Act, 
provided it was established through research that caste discrimination does exist in 
Britain. This section was added following a last-minute amendment to the Bill in the 
House of Lords, which the government decided not to oppose because to do so 
would have jeopardised the successful passage of the Bill through Parliament.  
 
The decision to include the enabling power in section 9(5)(a) rather than an 
immediate prohibition of caste discrimination was described by the government as a 
proportionate approach which would allow appropriate action to be taken if future 
research showed evidence of caste discrimination in Britain. There were four main 
reasons for this approach: a perceived lack of evidence of a problem requiring a 
legislative solution; the argument that caste discrimination was already covered by 
existing law on racial and religious discrimination; a wish to avoid the ‘proliferation of 
the protectorate’, i.e. an unjustifiable extension of the list of protected characteristics 
based on which discrimination is prohibited; and possible undesirable socio-political 
consequences, including negative impacts on community cohesion (Waughray, 
2013). 
 
The Equality Act received Royal Assent in April 2010, but the power under section 
9(5)(a) allowing ministerial intervention was not used for more than two years. 
However, in January 2013, three peers proposed an amendment to the Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Bill in the House of Lords making caste a new subset of race 
under section 9(1) of the Equality Act. This amendment was withdrawn, but a 
subsequent amendment proposing the addition of caste to the definition of race was 
adopted by the House of Lords in March 2013. The Lords amendment was defeated 
in the House of Commons on 16 April 2013, but six days later, following further 
debate, the House of Lords again voted for their amendment. Following this latest 
vote, the Coalition Government proposed a government amendment in lieu. 
 
This amendment replaced the discretionary power in section 9(5)(a) of the Equality 
Act 2010 with a duty to make caste an aspect of race for the purposes of the Equality 
Act 2010. It also provided for the possibility of review, amendment or repeal of the 
caste legislation after five years. It committed the government to introducing 
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secondary legislation to prohibit caste discrimination. The government’s amendment 
in lieu was agreed by the House of Lords on 24 April 2013 to become section 97 of 
the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. 
 
In the light of the new legislation, and as part of its statutory remit under the Equality 
Act 2010, the EHRC commissioned new research to develop the available evidence 
and analysis.  
 
1.3 The meaning of caste 
Caste is a form of identity that is used as a basis for social differentiation and usually 
involves inequality. It is generally accepted that caste is acquired by birth and 
sustained by endogamy, in which marriage is restricted to individuals of the same 
caste. According to Dr B.R. Ambedkar, a British-educated lawyer and one of the 
principal architects of the Indian Constitution, writing in 1916, ‘... [a] caste is an 
enclosed class’ and ‘endogamy is the only characteristic of caste’ (Ambedkar, 2002). 
Historically, and in some Sanskrit texts, caste involves the notion of ‘innate 
characteristics’ (Doniger, 2011: 211). 
 
The origins of caste and the mechanisms of its perpetuation are a matter of 
controversy. Sometimes the inherited identities are occupational in origin; or derived 
from the clans, guilds, religious sects or tribes historically integrated into Indian 
society as castes (Doniger, 2011). Sometimes orders of rank and discrimination are 
related to issues of ritual purity and pollution. As noted by Bayly (1999: 7): 'Caste 
was and is, to a considerable extent, what people think of it, and how they act on 
these perceptions’. Sociologists have tended to see caste as a system of social 
ranking, with recognised regional variations and considerable fluidity (Jodhka, 2012). 
Historians have charted the pre-colonial antecedents, colonial constructions and 
post-colonial variations of caste (Bayly, 1999; Dirks, 2002; Doniger, 2011). Finally, 
alongside castes, there are South Asian social identities categorised as ‘tribes’ and 
known collectively as Adivasis. These have a different history of non-integration, but 
also suffer inequality, marginalisation, and social separation and represent a sui 
generis or separate legal category broadly equivalent to an international concept of 
indigenousness (Gilbert, 2005). Sociologically speaking, the distinction between 
caste and tribe is to some extent arbitrary and reified by law. 
 
Today caste is often represented as a matter of cultural identity and community 
rather than inherited status and inequality (Gupta, 2000). This emphasis on ‘culture’ 
has, however, also been explained as an adaptation, in modern economic and 
democratic circumstances, of caste as a form of social differentiation that still serves 
to keep people in their socio-economic place (Natrajan, 2012). 
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In South Asia, where caste division is acknowledged as a part of life, it invariably 
involves unequal access to valued resources (e.g. land and water), to opportunities 
(education and employment) and to political power; and involves the humiliation of 
certain groups considered socially inferior. Such groups are deemed ‘untouchable’ 
and especially in rural society are often residentially segregated, excluded from 
public spaces and services (e.g. temples, teashops, village wells), and denied social 
respect. Caste is also a global structure and form of discrimination (or ‘opportunity 
hoarding’) that shapes labour, credit, rental and other markets, access to services 
(health, justice) and entrepreneurship (e.g., Iyer et al, 2013; Kumar, 2006; Lanjouw 
and Stern, 2003; Natrajan, 2012; Thorat and Newman, 2010). Caste has been a 
factor determining patterns of migration and is in turn altered by these patterns (for 
the UK, see Ballard, 1989; Dhanda, 2013a; Taylor, 2013).  
 
Globally, discrimination on grounds of caste is not strictly religious, nor ‘Hindu’; it 
exists among Christians, Muslims, Sikhs and other groups (Zene, 2002, O’Brien, 
2012, Mosse, 2012, Singh, 2012). An independent Indian commission pertinently 
noted that caste is a ‘general social characteristic’ regardless of ‘whether the 
philosophy and teachings of any particular religion recognise it or not’ (Ministry of 
Minority Affairs, 2009: 153-54).  
 
In Britain, as in India, the term ‘caste’ subsumes three concepts. First, there is varna, 
the hierarchical order of the four social functions or ‘classes’ of ancient India: 
Brahmin (priest), Kshatriya (warrior and ruler), Vaishya (trader or producer) and 
Shudra (servant, labourer). (The other meaning of varna as ‘colour’ has led to the 
misleading simplification that it denotes a racial hierarchy, see below). Excluded from 
the varna system, comprising a fifth category, are the Dalits, formerly known as 
‘Untouchables’. Dalit is a political term of self-identification adopted by many but not 
all people of so-called ‘Untouchable’ origin. It embraces a variety of distinct castes 
the names of which individuals may or may not wish to use, and which when used by 
others may be regarded as offensive because of the painful histories of 
subordination and humiliation they recall. ‘To call oneself Dalit, meaning “ground 
down”, “broken to pieces”, “crushed” is to convert a negative description into a 
confrontational identity’ (Rao, 2009: 1). 
 
Second, there is the South Asian concept of jati, signifying birth group. These are 
smaller scale, regional, endogamous groups, which are hierarchically ranked, within 
a geographical locality and are effectively the operational units of a system that 
varies with region and with historical periods. Unlike varna, the concept of jati is not 
connected to any one religious grouping, but is found in all the major South Asian 
religious communities. It is important to recognise that a jati (a caste) is not a fixed 
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unit. That is to say, different jatis may unite to form a larger grouping with shared 
status and identity (the group of jatis in effect being the ‘caste’ group with social 
significance), but also a jati may be divided into ‘sub-castes’ which are individually 
the socially significant identities and status groups. Which social groups are 
significant, and at which level (a group of jatis, a single jati/caste or a sub-caste) will 
vary between region, historical period, and social-political context. Any of these can 
appropriately be described as the caste in question. 
 
Third, caste also encompasses biradari. Biradari is a regional (largely Punjabi) term, 
in the UK mostly used by Muslim groups (in application to Sikhs in Britain, see Singh 
and Tatla, 2006: 29). O’ Brien (2012: 127-28) helpfully explains that: ‘Identity is found 
in relationships that fan out in concentric circles: parents, siblings, family, Biraderi, 
gotra, village, and tribe....A Biraderi will be united against another Biraderi but within 
it, two families will struggle for power.’ In Pakistani languages, caste is also referred 
to by the term zaat used interchangeably with biradari or biraderi or in combination 
with it (zaat-biradari). Zaat is in turn ‘related to ‘nasal’ (lineage), or quite literally, 
race’ (Gazdar, 2007).  
 
In everyday usage in Britain, caste is used interchangeably for varna, jati, and 
biradari. The paradigmatic usage, though, is of caste as jati. This usage is inclusive 
and in common parlance is also extended to include clan/tribe. 
 
Caste is also sometimes related to concepts of ethnic identity, race and religion. 
Some sociologists have described an ‘ethnicization’ of caste in recent decades; that 
is the transformation of caste from a ‘system’ of hierarchical inter-dependence, to a 
set of separate competing identities (Dumont, 1980; Gupta, 2000, see also Reddy, 
2005). This is a process encouraged, for example, by the role of caste in electoral 
politics in India. Caste as competing identities manifests itself in a unique way in 
Britain. However, despite the idea of caste as different cultural identities or 
‘communities’, whether in South Asia or in the UK, for the most part the salient 
divisions of caste occur within not across cultural divides. For example, Dalits have 
the shared experience of discrimination and subordination by dominant castes but do 
not form a distinct cultural group, being divided by language, religion, region, cultural 
practices and caste identities (Waughray, 2009). On this basis it can be said that, in 
sociological terms, caste is not equivalent to ethnic identity.  
 
Caste and race have long been interlinked. The predominance of racial theories in 
the nineteenth century led to the characterisation of caste as in essence 
corresponding to racial divisions, supplemented by the fact that varna translates as 
colour, leading to observations that the hierarchy must have originated in skin colour 
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differentiations. This has been strongly contested not least with evidence that skin 
colour gradations are irrelevant to caste distinctions (Keane, 2007; Waughray, 2009). 
Scholars have pointed out that the colour element of varna means colour symbolism 
reflecting the social hierarchy rather than skin colour or racial characteristics (Flood, 
1998). This narrow formulation of race as corresponding to skin colour broadened in 
the twentieth century when different forms of racial discrimination were recognised. 
Thus, caste came to be more readily understood as a separate or distinct form of 
racial discrimination. Indeed given its pre-dating of theories of race, caste has been 
labelled the oldest form of racial discrimination (Keane, 2007). 
 
Attitudes and practices of caste have always been regulated or modified by religion. 
Egalitarian traditions in Indic religions challenge caste hierarchy, while Dalits and 
others have formed sects or converted to other faiths as expressions of equality, 
such that identities of caste and religion intersect in complex ways. In the UK 
context, caste identities tend to be enclosed within, or muted by, publicly expressed 
religious identities (Leslie, 2003; Singh, 2012). In consequence, the forging of a 
positive identity in British society by Dalits may involve emphasising distinct religious 
identities. Conversely, successfully building a composite religious community (as in 
the ‘British Hindu community’) may require playing down caste separation in the 
public sphere, even when caste groupings remain important in networking, marriage 
and caste-based organisations. 
 
Finally, caste rules and prohibitions have always displayed strong legal 
characteristics (Waughray, 2013), with Ambedkar in particular viewing the caste 
system as a legal system misnamed as religion. His insight was to re-name the 
discriminatory effects of caste as legal rather than religious, hence subject to legal 
oversight, thereby introducing the possibility of reform (Ambedkar,1989: 76).  
 
1.4  Research on caste in Britain 
Research on caste in Britain has been multifaceted. Influential academic writings on 
caste have been produced by historians, philosophers, anthropologists and 
sociologists, and more recently by a very small handful of lawyers. These writings 
have featured within different contexts including religious education, the study of 
ancient texts, the political economy of migrant settlements and the effects of 
globalisation on the patterns of exchanges between resident populations in the UK 
and sending countries. What emerges is an understanding of caste as dynamic, but 
having resilient features of hierarchy between caste groups with the potential for 
caste-based conflict often masked as religious conflict.  
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Views on the existence and nature of caste prejudice, discrimination and harassment 
in Britain vary considerably. Some stakeholders believe that such discrimination 
exists, that it is highly destructive and should play no part in contemporary British 
social life; others take the view that caste is a positive form of association or social 
capital and that any social restrictions, prejudice or discrimination related to caste is 
limited to the private sphere and to personal social relations, for example, 
matrimonial arrangements (see further, Dhanda et al, 2014b). 
 
However, when one considers socialisation into caste identity, the border between 
the private and the public sphere is not very clearly defined. Further, the improved 
economic status of Dalits in the UK is not matched by the expected change in their 
cohesion with non-Dalits of South Asian origin (Dhanda, 2009, 2013b). In the case of 
inter-marriages, this caste barrier remains hard to breach and often comes with high 
costs for transgression (Dhanda, 2012a). 
 
Through their religious education in schools in the UK, children and young people 
learn to understand caste in terms of a textbook notion of varna. Through their 
experience in the school playground, they may learn to understand caste as jati 
when subjected to caste-based bullying, and confirm such an understanding by 
questioning their parents. In his study of Southall, Baumann (1996: 152) writes that 
by ‘school age, most children are aware of their own caste and of some version, at 
least, of its relative purity and status. Many indeed feel curious about the caste of 
peers at school’, and according to Nesbitt (1997), awareness of caste amongst the 
younger generation of South Asians living in Britain is heightened once they start 
school. Examples of bullying and name-calling are found in the work of Ghuman 
(2011) and Dhanda (2009).  
 
The relationship between caste and religion is complex as shown in recent 
overviews of Sikhism and Hinduism in Britain (Singh, 2012; Zavos, 2012). With 
regard to Sikhism, Singh (2012) notes that while the religion strongly emphasises 
equality, the immigrant population is caste-divided (between ‘upper’ Jat and ‘lower’ 
Dalit castes). Different sections of the Sikh community are organised by caste to a 
greater or lesser extent. The majority (80 percent) Sikh ‘mainstream’ is socially 
diverse, and while caste is not a major marker of identity, this mainstream has a Jat 
cultural complexion. Other sects or religious orders give expression to the desire for 
equality and the erasure of caste stigma through independence of worship and 
religious identity. 
 
This is the case with the Ravidassias (followers of the 15th century saint poet 
Ravidass) and Valmikis. In the UK, Ravidassias of Punjabi origin have staked a 
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claim to recognition as a religious group separate from the Sikhs. In the latest British 
Census, 11,045 people of England declared themselves as Ravidassias in the ‘any 
other religion’ category (Dhanda, forthcoming). As some Ravidassias, have never 
identified as Sikhs, for example in Varanasi, the birth place of Ravidass ji (Ram, 
2008), it is a mistake to describe them as a Sikh sect. Likewise, the constitutions of 
various Ravidass Sabhas in the UK lodged with the Charity Commission do not 
restrict Ravidassias to any specific caste (Dhanda, 2013b). Conversely, in a case 
concerning Ravidassias and Hindus in British Columbia, it was argued by the 
Ravidassia respondents that the Ravidassia religion was caste-specific (see Section 
2.4). 
 
In the UK, caste-related tensions within the Sikh community were noted in one of the 
earliest studies specifically focused on Dalits in Wolverhampton by Juergensmeyer 
(1982). Echoing the same, Ballard (1989) argued that in Britain, whilst the traditional 
hierarchies within the Sikh community may have been reversed in economic terms, 
in some cases (‘lower castes’ being more prosperous that ‘upper castes’), this ‘has 
not undermined casteism but rather reinforced it’ (Ballard, 1989: 225). More recently, 
Singh and Tatla (2006) have provided a nuanced study of the Sikhs in Britain that 
indicates how caste differentiations exert a pressure on the ‘boundaries of Sikhism’. 
 
In her study of Valmikis, Leslie (2003: 69) notes that ‘one of the first actions of the 
group in Britain was to abandon the stigmatic jāti names...in favour of the religious 
name "Valmiki"’. In a similar vein, the recent attempt by Ravidassias to stake a claim 
for a separate religious identity is the result of an accumulation of unaddressed 
grievances (Dhanda, 2013b).  
 
Studies of religious sectarianism in the UK show evidence of underlying caste 
prejudice (Kalsi, 1992; Sato, 2012), which may or may not amount to caste 
discrimination, but is nonetheless a source of tension within South Asian 
communities. However, there is an ambiguity in identifying caste or religion as the 
cause of discontent in the British context, where seeking a separation of religious 
identity has become a way of talking about caste.  
 
In the case of Hindus in Britain (in the majority Gujarati, with a significant numbers 
from East Africa), caste groupings remain important in networking, marriage and 
caste-based organisations (Zavos, 2012). However, the development of an 
ecumenical composite ‘British Hindu’ community involves the submerging of caste 
identity and a public rejection of negative (colonial) representations of Hinduism. 
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 Amongst Muslims of South Asian origin in Britain, caste identity expressed as 
biradari or zaat, is maintained as a system of endogamous, extended family or 
kinship grouping (Shaw, 2000; see also Ahmad, 1978; Bhatty, 1996; Hussain, 1999).  
 
There are notable generational differences in the experience and acknowledgement 
of caste prejudice. Dalit youth do not identify with caste as a hierarchical system; 
they are confident in facing prejudice, and associate discrimination with those who 
perpetuate it; they expect the law to be used to combat such discrimination (Dhanda, 
forthcoming).  
 
Young people learn, through popular music, to take ‘pride’ in their endogamous birth 
groups (jatis), further accentuated when parental socialisation directs them to find 
life-partners from their ‘own’ jati. The older, first generation of migrants from South 
Asia, might take caste as a ‘best forgotten’ cultural memory of a system they left 
behind (Ballard, 1994), but which nonetheless haunts them (Dhanda, forthcoming). 
Pride in one’s caste, amongst young people, also springs from a desire to recuperate 
religious space for a separate identity positioned to challenge the hegemony of 
dominant religious groups (Sato, 2012; see also Ram, 2008).  
 
In conclusion, research on caste in Britain shows the specificity of the reproduction 
of caste in the diaspora. A hitherto ambiguous understanding of what caste is now 
faces a challenge, when public discourse must respond to the legal change, which 
demands clarity, thoughtfulness and sensitivity in articulating the meaning of caste in 
the context of the proposed legislation. On the legal aspect, this report draws on 
groundbreaking work by Waughray (2009, 2013) and Keane (2007). In terms of the 
way the dynamic public discourse on caste is responding to legislative change, the 
parallel report on the expert and stakeholder events (Dhanda et al, 2014b) sets out 
the present situation. It explains alternative viewpoints on caste from different social 
positions and the desires and concerns regarding the law on caste and its 
implementation that exist among a range of stakeholders (including professional 
groups).  
 
1.5  Methodology 
The review of socio-legal research was conducted between October and December 
2013. The aim was to explore socio-legal definitions of caste within the framework of 
the Equality Act 2010. Desk research was undertaken to provide a detailed review of 
existing legal research literature on caste and the law in Britain and internationally. 
As well as academic works, this included ‘grey’ literature such as reports from NGOs 
and reports from faith-based community organisations that were not widely 
accessible nor in the public domain, working papers from academics, conference 
CASTE IN BRITAIN 
 
 
 
10 
 
proceedings, Hansard reports and parliamentary debates, internet websites and 
United Nations documents. Case reports, court and tribunal judgments, legislation 
(including commentaries and explanatory notes), and academic commentaries on 
legislation and caselaw were also reviewed. Current research on caste 
discrimination being undertaken by academics and PhD students was also included 
under this category.  
 
The material gathered was then interrogated applying a critical analysis approach 
and used to inform both this report and to prepare the questions for participants 
invited to attend either the experts’ seminar or the later stakeholders’ workshop (see 
Dhanda et al, 2014b). 
 
Subsequent discussions and the written statements from the experts’ seminar fed 
into this comprehensive review of legislation and caselaw. In addition, a number of 
meetings were undertaken with legal experts specialising in discrimination law, both 
practising lawyers and academics. 
 
1.6  Scope of the report 
The structure of the present report reflects the range of meanings attached to caste 
as a legal term and emphasises its scope. It is not an investigation as to the extent of 
caste discrimination in Britain and operates instead as a review of the law on caste 
as presently understood. The focus is on the legal parameters of caste 
discrimination, in particular how caste is best incorporated within the Equality Act 
2010. This can be usefully informed by existing research on caste in Britain reported 
in Section 1.4. 
 
1.7  Guide to the report 
Chapter 2 focuses on the Equality Act 2010, exploring the extent to which caste can 
be captured by existing protected characteristics, as well as the small number of 
attempts in caselaw to argue that caste discrimination is subsumed within these 
characteristics. It further reviews the relevance of the exceptions in their potential 
application to caste as well as the application to caste of the Public Sector Equality 
Duty. Chapter 3 looks at the emergence of caste discrimination as an issue in 
international treaty law by United Nations bodies and the experience of legislating for 
caste discrimination in the national jurisdictions of other States. India is the 
paradigmatic example, but other States such as Mauritius have included caste as a 
ground for non-discrimination in their domestic orders. Chapter 4 offers a snapshot 
of the current state of the law on caste in Britain. It proposes a legal formulation of 
caste as an aspect of race, the pathway to a definition on caste, and highlights areas 
for future research to carry forward. 
CASTE IN BRITISH LAW 
  
 
 
11 
 
2.  Caste in British law 
 
This chapter addresses the legal status of caste in domestic law. Section 97 of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 requires that caste be made an aspect 
of race in the Equality Act 2010, although it does not indicate how this is to be 
achieved. This chapter proceeds on the basis that caste will be made an aspect of 
race in the legislation, although, at present it is not included. First, the chapter will 
outline the principles underpinning domestic discrimination law and their relevance to 
caste. Second, it will consider the potential for caste to be read into the existing 
protected characteristic of race, specifically ethnic origins. Third, it will consider the 
potential for caste to be read into the existing protected characteristic of religion or 
belief. Fourth, it will detail the small body of caselaw relevant to caste. Fifth, it will 
consider the possible application to caste of the exceptions in the Equality Act 2010. 
Caste is not yet an aspect of the protected characteristic of race, but when it is 
included in the legislation, the question of whether the existing exceptions are 
adequate, or whether specific exceptions are required to deal with caste, will need to 
be addressed. Sixth, it will consider the possible application to caste of the Public 
Sector Equality Duty contained in the Equality Act 2010, once caste is made an 
aspect of race.  
 
2.1 Key features and principles of British discrimination law 
Discrimination in its legal sense has a technical meaning (Bamforth et al, 2008). The 
Equality Act 2010 does not guarantee that equality will be achieved and prohibits 
discrimination in certain areas of activity only. Outside these areas discrimination is 
not unlawful. Domestic discrimination law is designed largely to respond to individual 
claims with individual remedies made on the basis of legally defined characteristics, 
in relation to certain types of regulated behaviour and relationships and social goods 
(Bamforth et al, 2008). However, the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) contained 
in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 extends this by imposing a duty on public 
bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and to promote 
equality of opportunity and good relations between persons or groups defined by 
reference to protected characteristics. 
 
To amount to unlawful discrimination, behaviour must meet three criteria. First, the 
behaviour must be because of a protected characteristic. Second, it must occur in a 
legally regulated field such as employment, the provision of goods, facilities and 
services, education and vocational training, management or disposal of premises, or 
the exercise of public functions. Discriminatory behaviour occurring in non-regulated 
fields is outside the ambit of the Equality Act (e.g. ‘private sphere’ relations such as 
intimate social interactions or marriage). Third, it must amount to a prohibited type of 
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conduct (e.g. direct or indirect discrimination, harassment or victimisation). Behaviour 
which does not meet these criteria may be objectionable but it is not unlawful 
discrimination (Waughray, 2009). 
 
The UK adopts a ‘grounds-based’ approach to discrimination law, meaning that 
legislation affords protection from discrimination on specified grounds. In domestic 
and European Union (EU) discrimination legislation, the grounds on which 
discrimination is regulated – termed ‘protected characteristics’ in the Equality Act 
2010 - are enumerated in a closed list. Inevitably this leads to demands for the list of 
protected characteristics to be extended, or for the existing categories to be 
interpreted so as to include forms of discrimination which are not expressly covered 
(McColgan, 2007). In some cases, categories have been added in response to the 
obligation to implement EU anti-discrimination law - for example religion or belief, and 
sexual orientation (McColgan, 2005, 2007).  
 
Section 97 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 requires that caste be 
made ‘an aspect of’ the protected characteristic of race in section 9 of the Equality 
Act 2010. Until this happens, legal protection against caste discrimination depends 
on establishing in the courts, on a case by case basis, that caste is subsumed within 
an existing protected characteristic. The Equality Act 2010 lists nine protected 
characteristics: age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; 
pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; and sexual orientation. Caste is 
not in this list (neither is descent). Of these nine, the only possible ‘legal homes’ for 
caste are race, or religion or belief (Waughray, 2009).  
 
2.2 Equality Act 2010: race, ethnic origins and caste 
Section 9 of the Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination on grounds of race. The 
previous legislation, the Race Relations Act 1976, prohibited discrimination on ‘racial 
grounds’ or by reference to membership of a racial group. Racial grounds were 
defined in the 1976 Act to include colour, race, nationality, or ethnic or national 
origins. In the Equality Act 2010, race is defined in section 9 as including colour, 
nationality, or ethnic or national origins. The Explanatory Notes to section 9 explain 
that persons who share characteristics of colour, nationality, ethnic or national origins 
can be described as belonging to a particular racial group. There is no detailed 
explanation or definition of colour, nationality, or ethnic or national origins, but the 
Explanatory Notes provide the following examples: colour includes being black or 
white; nationality includes being a British, Australian or Swiss citizen; ethnic or 
national origins include being from a Roma background or of Chinese heritage (the 
Explanatory Notes imply that ethnic or national origins are a single category but this 
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is incorrect); a racial group could be 'black Britons' which would encompass those 
people who are both black and who are British citizens.  
 
There is no link between caste and nationality, or national origins, and the link 
between caste and colour is not sufficient to argue that people of Dalit origin are 
members of a group or groups defined by reference to this ground (Waughray, 2009). 
Historically, however, there has long been overlap in the usage and application of the 
terms race, caste and ethnic origins (Reddy, 2005). For these reasons, it is 
necessary to consider whether caste could be subsumed within the existing concept 
of ethnic origins, which is a subset of the protected characteristic of race. 
 
The leading case of Mandla (Sewa Singh) and another v Dowell Lee (1983) 
established that ‘ethnicity’ was not synonymous with ‘race’ in a narrow, biological 
sense but was to be construed ‘relatively widely’ in a broad cultural/historic sense. 
Lord Fraser held that, for a group to constitute an ethnic group, it must regard itself 
and be regarded by others as a distinct community by virtue of certain 
characteristics, two of which are essential: a distinct, living and long shared history as 
a group; and a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs, often 
but not necessarily associated with religious observance. Additional but non-essential 
characteristics include: common geographical origins or descent; a common 
language (although not necessarily peculiar to the group); common literature peculiar 
to the group; a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or the 
surrounding community; and being a minority or an oppressed or dominant group 
within a larger community. Based on these criteria the House of Lords found in 
Mandla that Sikhs were a group defined by reference to ethnic origins.  
 
A recent approach to the meaning of ethnic origins, has opened up arguments that 
caste is subsumed within ethnic origins, by virtue of the descent aspect of ‘ethnic’. In 
R (E) v JFS (2009), the Supreme Court revisited the Mandla meaning of ethnic 
origins (Donald, 2012; Cranmer, 2010; Graham, 2012). It held that ethnic origins was 
defined not just in the wide Mandla sense, but also in the narrower, more traditional 
sense of a person’s lineage or descent; indeed, prior to Mandla, a narrow test based 
on birth or descent would have been regarded as required in order for there to be 
discrimination based on ethnic origins (Waughray, 2013). 
 
On the meaning of descent, Lord Mance referred, obiter, to the definition of racial 
discrimination in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 1965 (ICERD) which lists five grounds, race, colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin, and to the interpretation of the third ground ‘descent’ by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) as including caste. 
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CERD held in its General Recommendation 29 that ‘descent’ includes communities 
who suffer from discrimination ‘on the basis of caste and analogous systems of 
inherited status.’ This crucial interpretation by CERD is discussed further in Chapter 
3, but for the purposes of British discrimination law it is important to emphasise that 
Lord Mance was not declaring that caste is subsumed within the descent element of 
ethnic origins. Rather, his point was to illustrate that descent has been given a broad 
construction at the international level in support of his view that it ought to extend 
sufficiently widely to cover the situation presented in the JFS case.  
 
Since JFS, there have been two rulings on the question of whether caste is 
subsumed within race in domestic law as currently stated. In Naveed v Aslam (2011), 
the Claimant contended that he had been racially discriminated against by the 
Respondents because of his membership of the Pakistani caste known as Arain, on 
account of which he was ridiculed and abused. The Employment Tribunal ruled that: 
 
... the Claimant’s complaint of discrimination based on his caste was 
doomed to fail for two reasons. First, no order has yet been made 
extending section 9 of the Equality Act 2010 so as to provide for caste to 
amount of itself to an aspect of race. Second, we consider that it is quite 
impossible for the Claimant’s caste to fall under the existing definition of 
ethnic origins because of the Claimant’s clear acceptance that movement 
within the Arain caste is possible and that it was the claimant’s status 
within the same caste as the Aslam brothers [the Respondents, also 
members of the Arain caste but, according to the Claimant, of a higher 
category within the same caste] which he claims led to his treatment. In 
the Tribunal’s judgment the substance of the Claimant’s allegations is that 
he was being treated differently on account of his ‘class’. 
 
What the Tribunal did not consider was the possibility that the term ‘caste’ has many 
meanings and that the Claimant and the Respondents may have been of different 
sub-castes or jatis - with ensuing differences of status - within the wider Arain group 
or caste. It attributed the discrimination to be class-based rather than caste-based as 
a result (Waughray, 2013). The complexity of caste may be more readily 
acknowledged if caste is included as an independent aspect of race, rather than 
being subsumed under ethnic origins. 
 
Leaving aside the decision in Naveed v Aslam, arguments that caste is an aspect of 
ethnic origins face a number of hurdles. A fundamental element of caste is the 
separateness of caste groups. It was not until the early twentieth century that Dalits 
emerged in India as a nationally identifiable political and social entity. Dalits in India 
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are linked by a common experience of oppression and 'Untouchability', but are not 
otherwise a culturally, linguistically or historically coherent group. For centuries they 
were separated from each other geographically, regionally, linguistically and 
culturally, with the distinctions and hierarchies between Dalit jatis sometimes 
enforced as rigorously as those between Dalit and non-Dalit jatis. Although in India 
Dalits have become an increasingly important political category, it is not clear that 
British Dalits could collectively fulfil the Mandla criteria. In Nyazi v Rymans 
[Employment Appeals Tribunal 6/88, unreported], Muslims were denied recognition 
as an ethnic group due to their linguistic, geographical and racial heterogeneity. 
Individual jatis (castes or sub-castes; see Section 1.3), including Dalit jatis, could 
possibly fulfil the Mandla criteria; but taken as a broad category, Dalits might struggle 
to demonstrate sufficient commonality of geography, language, religion and culture, 
and a sufficiently distinct, long shared history as a group to pass the Mandla test for 
ethnic group (Waughray, 2009, 2013).  
 
JFS reaffirmed descent as an integral element of ethnic origins in domestic law; and 
Lord Mance noted the broad construction given to 'descent' at the international level, 
which extends to caste (see Chapter 3). In order to construe caste as part of race in 
domestic law following the JFS route, a three-fold interpretive leap must be made; 
caste must be viewed as part of descent, itself part of ethnic origins, which in turn is a 
sub-set of race. Whatever the possibilities of interpreting the existing legislation in 
this way, an interpretation can be overruled until it is determined by the Supreme 
Court. Legal clarification in the form of a statutory provision is thus still required.  
 
Very recent caselaw has seen such an interpretive approach. Tirkey v Chandok 
(2013) concerned complaints of race and religious discrimination, including caste 
discrimination as part of these complaints. In December 2013, in a preliminary 
hearing, an Employment Tribunal met to consider striking out the claim of caste 
discrimination on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success because it 
had no jurisdiction to consider it. In January 2014, the Tribunal concluded that, in the 
context of the case, section 9(1) of the Equality Act 2010 can be and should be 
construed in such a way as to provide for caste discrimination to be part of the 
protected characteristic of race discrimination. The Tribunal noted that: 
 
[T]here is no comprehensive and exhaustive definition of race in Section 
9(1) of the Equality Act. It “includes” ethnic origin. This in itself is a wide 
concept, as is clear from the authorities. It can therefore be argued that 
“caste” is already part of the protected characteristic of race, purely by 
reference to section 9(1). Further, the domestic case law - in particular the 
cases of Mandla and the Jewish Free School case - provide authority for 
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the proposition that discrimination by descent is unlawful as it is direct race 
discrimination. 
 
The Claimant’s case was that she is lower caste by birth and therefore descent, a 
position in society that she cannot change. In contrast to Naveed, the Tribunal 
concluded that the fact that the government has decided to legislate to make it clear 
that caste is an aspect of the protected characteristic of race, does not determine 
whether race can be construed to cover caste. 
 
This ruling - that caste is already protected under race by virtue of ethnic origins - 
may be appealed; the Employment Appeal Tribunal may take a different view. Added 
to the different decisions in Naveed and Tirkey, in both of these cases caste arose in 
situations that did not match the stereotypical caste discrimination case (see Section 
2.3). This highlights the importance of avoiding an overly narrow definition of caste in 
the Equality Act 2010. 
 
2.3  Equality Act: religion or belief and caste 
Caste is to be included in the Equality Act 2010 as an aspect of the protected 
characteristic of race. Nevertheless, in some situations religion or belief 
discrimination might be considered a more appropriate approach. Section 10 of the 
Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. Religion is 
defined in section 10 as ‘any religion’ or ‘lack of religion’; and belief as ‘any religious 
or philosophical belief’ or ‘lack of belief’. The Explanatory Notes to the Act explain 
that it is ‘a broad definition in line with the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The main limitation for the purposes of Article 9 ECHR is that the religion 
must have a clear structure and belief system. Denominations or sects within a 
religion can be considered to be a religion or belief, such as Protestants and 
Catholics within Christianity. The Equality Act’s Explanatory Notes set out five criteria 
for a ‘philosophical belief’ to qualify for protection. These are contained in paragraph 
52.  
 
Caste as a characteristic is distinct from religion or belief. By definition, caste 
discrimination is motivated by the known, perceived or assumed caste status of the 
victim, not the religion or belief to which the victim is known or thought to subscribe or 
belong. It is misconceived to conflate caste status with religion, notwithstanding the 
fact that caste differentiation finds support in Sanskrit texts (Doniger, 2011). Caste 
discrimination is captured by religious discrimination provisions only in those limited 
situations where the victim’s ascribed caste status is considered ‘part of’ or integral to 
their religion or belief (Waughray, 2009). Caste distinctions more usually operate 
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within rather than between religions, and caste distinctions do not usually correspond 
to separate religion or belief identities, although this can occur. A paradigmatic caste 
discrimination case is perceived as involving ‘high caste’ and ‘low caste’ individuals 
of the same religion. Yet it is worth noting that the handful of cases on caste 
discrimination (see Section 2.4) has not followed this pattern.  
 
Historically, religion has been a means to remove oneself from the stigma of caste 
identity, particularly for Dalits, through the creation of religious groups such as the 
Ravidassias (Juergensmeyer, 1982; Ram, 2008) or the Valmikis (Nesbitt, 1990; 
Leslie, 2003; Dhanda, 2012b). If such groups are found by the courts to be distinct 
'sects' within existing religions, or alternatively to be independent religions with clear 
structures and belief systems, caste discrimination against members of such groups 
(although motivated by caste rather than religious affiliation) could theoretically be 
captured by religious discrimination provisions as caste and religious identity may be 
perceived to be sufficiently related.  
 
Yet, using religious discrimination provisions in such cases would mask rather than 
expose the caste-based aspects of the discrimination. For example, someone who 
discriminates against an Ambedkarite (Dalit) Buddhist may not discriminate against a 
Sri Lankan Buddhist, the underlying reason for the discrimination against the 
Ambedkarite Buddhist being caste, not Buddhism (Waughray, 2009). By collapsing 
religion and caste into each other, the distinct nature of each can be lost. 
 
Section 14 of the Equality Act 2010 provides for the concept of combined 
discrimination on grounds of dual characteristics, where discrimination occurs in a 
combination of two relevant protected characteristics (such as race and religion). 
However, the Coalition Government decided not to bring forward section 14 and it is 
not in force. Nevertheless, caselaw has clarified that where treatment is on the 
grounds of more than one protected characteristic, where one of these is a significant 
element rather than the only element, it may be relied upon (MoD v DeBlique [2010] 
IRLR 471 at 165; O’Reilly v BBC; ET Case No. 2200423/10). 
  
2.4 Existing caselaw relevant to caste 
The caselaw on caste is limited. Certain cases have already been discussed in 
Section 2.2. Nevertheless, it is useful to draw together the body of caselaw where the 
issue of caste has been raised in the context of equality law. 
 
In the only pre-Equality Act 2010 case involving a claim of caste discrimination, 
Begraj and Begraj v Heer Manak Solicitors and others - Britain’s first caste 
discrimination case - the claimants alleged religious and/ or racial discrimination, 
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arguing that caste fell within race or ethnic origins under the Race Relations Act 
1976. However the case collapsed in February 2013 due to judicial recusal. Caste 
has also arisen in other areas, for example in immigration law; see MA (Galgale Sab 
clan) Somalia CG [2006] UK AIT 00073 where ‘caste’ was construed to include the 
concept of ‘clan’. In this case, the appellant was a member of the Galgala clan in 
Somalia. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal found that the Galgala were a ‘sab’ or low 
caste clan. Elsewhere in the decision the Galgala are described as a small, low 
status group or low caste group. 
 
At the time of writing, there are only two domestic cases in which a decision has 
been reached on the question of whether race as currently defined in the Equality Act 
2010 can be construed to include caste; and the Tribunals came to different 
conclusions. As stated above, in Naveed, the lack of an order ‘extending section 9 of 
the Equality Act 2010 so as to provide for caste to amount of itself to an aspect of 
race’ was one of two reasons why the Employment Tribunal considered a claim of 
caste discrimination ‘doomed to fail’. The argument was that Parliament would not 
have included the power in section 9(5)(a) if it thought caste was already covered by 
an existing protected characteristic. The second reason - that on its facts the 
Claimant’s case was about class rather than caste and so could not fall under the 
existing definition of ethnic origins in any event - is addressed in Section 2.2. 
 
In contrast, in Tirkey, as discussed in Section 2.2, it was ruled in January 2014 in a 
preliminary hearing that, in the context of that case, race could and should be 
construed as including caste; race includes ethnic origins, which is a wide concept; 
moreover, caselaw has held that discrimination by descent is direct race 
discrimination (Mandla, JFS); and caste is based on descent. The fact that the  
government has decided to legislate to make caste an aspect of race is not 
determinative of the issue. Tirkey may be appealed, and the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal may take a different view. Naveed and Tirkey, however, signal that the 
functioning of caste in the Equality Act 2010 will be played out in caselaw. 
 
Two reported cases, one in Britain and one in Canada, illustrate the use of religious 
discrimination provisions by possible or alleged victims of caste discrimination in the 
absence of caste-specific provisions. In both cases the complainants were ‘high  
caste’ Hindus and the respondents were Ravidassias. In Saini v All Saints Haque 
Centre & Others (2009) the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respondents 
had subjected the claimant to discriminatory harassment based on religion. The case 
report notes that Ravidassias ‘form a distinct group with distinctive religious beliefs 
that distinguish them from both the Sikh and Hindu communities’. Caste was not 
brought up before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, but in the earlier, unreported 
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Employment Tribunal hearing, caste arose indirectly in a reference to an article 
referring to the 'discriminatory treatment meted out in parts of medieval India to lower 
castes such as Ravidassias by high caste Hindus.' This case illustrates the 
sometimes complex interrelationship between caste and religion. 
 
The second case, Sahota and Shergill v Shri Guru Ravidass Sabha Temple 
(Vancouver) (2008), involved a complaint brought before the British Columbia Human 
Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) by two ‘higher caste’ Hindus alleging discrimination 
contrary to the British Columbia Human Rights Code 1996 (the Code), based on 
ancestry, race and religion in the provision of an accommodation, service or facility 
customarily available to the public by the Shri Guru Ravidass Sabha Temple of 
Vancouver (the Sabha). The Sabha had denied them membership because they 
were not Ravidassias of the Chamar caste (formerly an ‘Untouchable’ caste). The 
complainants argued that discrimination on the basis of caste is religious, cultural 
and economic discrimination and that therefore the discrimination against them was 
inter alia discrimination based on religion, a form of discrimination covered by the 
Code, whereas discrimination based on caste was not; specifically, they complained 
that they were refused membership because of their caste ‘and the religious 
background of the caste’.  
 
The BCHRT dismissed the complaint as outside its jurisdiction, accepting the 
respondents’ arguments that membership of the Sabha was restricted to the 
Ravidassia community who by definition were members of the Chamar caste, and 
that the Code did not apply to membership of the Sabha because it was a private, 
purely social, religious and cultural organisation. As such it had chosen to restrict its 
membership to persons in the Ravidassia community and had defined that 
community to include only those of the Chamar caste (although in Britain, research 
on the Ravidassia community has shown that membership of Ravidassia Sabhas is 
not restricted by caste) (Dhanda, 2013b; see Section 1.4). This case also indicates 
the complex interrelationship between caste and religion, and that in the absence of 
caste-specific provisions complainants might seek to bring complaints under other 
characteristics where possible.  
 
Overall, the caselaw indicates that in the absence of specific provisions on caste the 
issue will nevertheless be raised. Although race is the more relevant characteristic, 
arguments around religion will also occur, and courts and tribunals will be obliged to 
make interpretive decisions. The existing cases serve to mark the issue as present 
and subject to being litigated.  
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2.5 Equality Act: exceptions and caste 
The Equality Act 2010 contains certain exceptions and exclusions to the prohibition 
of discrimination, victimisation and harassment on grounds of the protected 
characteristics. This means that in prescribed circumstances it will be lawful to treat 
someone differentially because of a protected characteristic. The exceptions and 
exclusions are set out in the main body of the Act and in in Schedules relating to 
work (Schedule 9), services and public functions (Schedule 3), premises (Schedule 
5), education (Schedules 11 and 12), and associations (Schedule 16). Schedule 23 
contains several general exceptions. These include provisions permitting certain 
organisations relating to religion or belief to impose restrictions relating to religion 
and belief and sexual orientation when offering membership or participation in 
activities of that organisation; in the provision of non-commercial services in the 
course of their activities; and in the use or disposal of premises owned or controlled 
by the organisation.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.4, there are two rulings on whether caste already falls 
within the protected characteristic of race in the Equality Act 2010. In the most recent 
of these, Tirkey, the Tribunal found in that case that race as currently stated can and 
should be construed to include caste. In cases such as this, in the circumstances 
prescribed, the exceptions applicable to race would also apply to caste, where 
appropriate. Also, exceptions applying to religion could, where relevant, potentially 
apply to certain religious groupings provided religion and caste are sufficiently related 
(see Section 2.3). At the time of writing, the government has indicated that it will 
consult on what exceptions should apply to caste under new provisions prohibiting 
discrimination because of caste which will clarify the position.  
 
Exceptions applying to work  
The exceptions applying to work which are relevant to race, and hence to caste once 
it is made an aspect of race, are contained in Schedule 9 Paragraphs 1 and 3, 
discussed below. To date the handful of cases on caste discrimination have all 
involved work situations. 
 
Genuine Occupational Requirement 
Schedule 9 Paragraph 1 allows employers to rely on a ‘genuine occupational 
requirement’ (GOR) exception in relation to all the protected characteristics whereby 
the employer can apply, in relation to work, a requirement to have a particular 
protected characteristic, provided that, having regard to the nature or context of the 
work, three conditions are met: (1) it is an occupational requirement; (2) the 
application of the requirement is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim; 
and (3) the person to whom the requirement applies does not meet it (or the 
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employer has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that the person meets it). It 
follows that under the GOR exception, a work requirement to be of a particular caste 
would only be allowed if the three conditions above are met. According to the 
Equality Act Explanatory Notes, the requirement must be crucial to the post and not 
merely one of several important factors. It must also not be a sham or pretext. The 
Explanatory Notes provide a number of examples. Based on these it is apparent that 
the justifications for the exception are set relatively high, and the burden of showing 
that the exception applies rests clearly on the employer seeking to rely on it. An 
employer seeking to rely on the GOR exception in relation to race, including caste, 
once it is made an aspect of race, will have to meet this very high threshold. 
 
Other requirements relating to religion or belief and work 
In addition to the normal GOR discussed above, Schedule 9 Paragraph 3 allows an 
employer with an ethos based on religion or belief to discriminate in relation to work 
by applying a requirement to be of a particular religion or belief if, but only if, having 
regard to that ethos, being of that religion or belief is a requirement for the work; and 
applying the requirement is proportionate so as to achieve a legitimate aim. It is for 
an employer to show that it has an ethos based on religion or belief by reference to 
such evidence as the organisation’s founding constitution. This exception differs from 
the normal GOR because there is no requirement for the characteristic to be an 
occupational requirement. The ‘religious organisations’ exception would allow, for 
example, a Valmiki organisation to restrict key posts to Valmikis. This must be based 
on the religious ethos of the organisation. Caste is to be made an aspect of race, not 
religion or belief, and consequently the exception does not mean that restrictions can 
be made on the basis of caste. It would not allow an employer with an ethos based 
on religion or belief to restrict key posts such as priests on grounds of race, which will 
include caste. 
 
Exceptions applying to services and public functions 
Schedule 3 Paragraph 30 allows services to be generally provided only for persons 
who share a protected characteristic. It follows that, once the secondary legislation 
making caste an aspect of race is in force, it would be permissible under Schedule 3 
to provide services in such a way that the service is commonly used by people of a 
specific caste, although it would not be permissible to refuse to provide the service to 
people of other castes unless it was impracticable to do so. 
 
Schedule 3 Paragraph 15 exempts from the prohibition of discrimination in the 
provision of services those people providing care within their own home, whether 
paid or unpaid. It follows that once caste is made an aspect of race, it might be 
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permissible for a person to restrict the provision of care in their own home to persons 
of a particular caste.  
 
Exceptions applying to premises 
Under Schedule 5 Paragraph 1, an owner-occupier who disposes of part of premises 
privately can refuse to dispose of premises on grounds of religion, but not on grounds 
of race. The Explanatory Notes give examples whereby a refusal to rent or sell 
privately on the grounds of race is unlawful, whereas a refusal to rent or sell privately 
on grounds of religion is lawful. Similarly, in relation to lodgers, where the owner-
occupier shares some facilities with the tenant such as a kitchen, the prospective 
tenant can be refused if they are of a different religion, but cannot be refused on 
grounds of race, which will include caste. The religion exception does not apply if the 
discrimination is on grounds of race, which will include caste. For example, it would 
be lawful for an owner-occupier who is a Hindu (or a Sikh) to refuse, on grounds of 
religion, a prospective tenant of the Valmiki or Ravidassia religion, but only if the 
refusal is on grounds of religion; it cannot be on grounds of the prospective tenant’s 
caste, which will become an aspect of race. 
 
Exceptions applying to organisations relating to religion or belief  
Schedule 23 Paragraph 2 contains a general exception in respect of organisations 
relating to religion or belief (‘religious organisations’) which allows them to 
discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in certain circumstances. The definition of 
a religious organisation for the purposes of this exception is set out in Schedule 23; 
the types of organisation that can use this exception are those that exist to practice, 
advance or teach a religion or belief; allow people of a religion or belief to participate 
in any activity or receive any benefit related to that religion or belief; promote good 
relations between people of different religions or beliefs. This exception allows 
religious organisations to impose restrictions on membership, participation in their 
activities, the use of goods, facilities or services they provide, and the use of their 
premises, by reference to religion or belief; but not on grounds of race, which will 
include caste. The restriction on grounds of religion or belief is only permitted if it is 
imposed to comply with the purpose of the organisation, or to avoid causing offence 
to members of the religion or belief that the organisation represents. If the main 
purpose of the organisation is commercial, it cannot rely on this exception. This 
means that a Ravidassia organisation which meets the criteria of a religious 
organisation may restrict its membership or the use of its facilities, services or 
premises to adherents of the Ravidassia religion; but once the secondary legislation 
making caste an aspect of race is in force, it could not impose restrictions on the 
basis of caste. 
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Exceptions applying to education 
It is unlawful under the Equality Act 2010 for education bodies to discriminate against 
school pupils, students, or applicants, subject to a number of exceptions. These 
exceptions cover well-known matters such as admission to single-sex schools 
(Schedule 11 Part 1). Similarly, schools with a religious character are permitted to 
give preference in admissions to members of that religion (Schedule 11 Part 2). 
However as per JFS (see Section 2.2), no school can discriminate on grounds of 
race, which will include caste. There are no recognised exceptions relating to schools 
and race, and further exceptions to provisions on harassment do not extend to race, 
which will include caste.  
 
In section 85(2)(a) of the Equality Act 2010, schools must not discriminate against a 
pupil in the way they provide education. In addition, section 89(1)(b) of the Education 
and Inspection Act 2006 requires that head teachers must determine measures to be 
taken with a view to encouraging good behaviour and respect for others on the part 
of pupils and in particular preventing all forms of bullying among pupils. Preventing 
caste-based bullying would fall under this statutory obligation. 
 
The National Curriculum (NC) requires schools to provide a broad and balanced 
curriculum for all pupils, and to take account of their duties under equality legislation, 
which include providing protection from discrimination and harassment on the 
grounds of race. The Education Act 2002 section 29 also requires schools to promote 
the ‘spiritual’ development of its pupils. Furthermore, the Equality Act 2010 section 
149 (the Public Sector Equality Duty) requires public sector bodies such as schools 
and others exercising public functions (including those providing state maintained 
education) to eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation; to advance 
equality of opportunity; and to foster good relations between persons having different 
protected characteristics. As such, schools must adapt the National Curriculum 
programmes of study so as to meet the specific needs and provide effective learning 
opportunities for all pupils, including individuals and groups of pupils. The Citizenship 
Programme of Study for example, requires pupils to learn about ‘diverse national, 
regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the need for 
mutual respect and understanding' which can be adapted to take account of local 
circumstances, such as community mix. Section 29 of the Education Act 2002 
requires the governing body of all maintained schools to have a complaints 
procedure and to publicise such a procedure. A parent can pursue their complaint to 
the Secretary of State if after using the local procedure they believe the school is still 
failing to carry out its statutory duties. In light of the above, it could be suggested that 
schools review their religious education text-books to ensure that they meet the 
criteria above in relation to caste (see also Dhanda et al, 2014b). 
CASTE IN BRITAIN 
 
 
 
24 
 
Exceptions applying to associations 
According to section 107(2) of the Equality Act 2010, an association is an association 
of persons which has at least 25 members and admission to membership of which is 
regulated by the association’s rules and involves a process of selection. It does not 
matter whether an association is incorporated or whether its activities are carried on 
for profit. A small private club with less than 25 members which is not open to the 
public and which has no formal rules, such as a book club run by a group of friends, 
is not an association for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. Commercial clubs 
which require membership as a condition of admission, but with no selection process, 
such as gym clubs, are not associations for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. 
Under the exceptions in Schedule 16, it is permissible for an association to restrict 
membership and guests to people sharing a protected characteristic, for example 
religion or belief, nationality, and national or ethnic origins; but not colour. 
Associations for particular castes would therefore be permissible under the present 
provisions of the Equality Act 2010.  
 
Exceptions applying to charities 
S.193 of the Equality Act 2010 permits charities as defined by the Charities Act 2006 
to restrict the provision of benefits to persons sharing a protected characteristic, with 
the exception of colour, if the restriction is contained in its charitable instrument and if 
the provision of benefits is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, or to 
prevent or compensate for a disadvantage linked to the protected characteristic.  
It follows that a charity providing benefits to members of a particular caste is 
permissible given that race, excluding the subset of colour, can operate as an 
exception, provided this is in line with the charitable instrument and it is objectively 
justified, or is to prevent or compensate for disadvantage.  
 
Charities must not restrict benefits consisting of employment, contract work or 
vocational training to people who share a protected characteristic, except in relation 
to disability in limited cases. A charity may insist on acceptance of a religion or belief 
as a condition of membership, or may restrict access to its benefits and services to 
members who do not accept a religion or belief even where membership itself is not 
subject to such a condition, if this has been the case since before 18 May 2005.  
 
2.6  The Public Sector Equality Duty and caste 
The current Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) was introduced in the Equality Act 
2010 and the Equality Act (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011, and came into force on 
5 April 2011. The duties require public sector bodies, or private sector organisations 
when performing public functions, to pay due regard to the statutory needs of 
eliminating discrimination, harassment and victimisation, advancing equality, and 
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fostering good relations between persons defined by reference to the protected 
characteristics. 
 
The PSED is made up of a General Duty and Specific Duties. The General Equality 
Duty is contained in section 149(1), and requires public sector bodies to give ‘due 
regard’ to three statutory needs; (a) the elimination of discrimination, harassment, 
victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Act; (b) the 
advancement of equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant 
protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) the fostering of good 
relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons 
who do not share it. What is meant by giving ‘due regard’ is explained further in 
section 149(3) and in the significant caselaw which has developed in this area. Public 
sector bodies are no longer obliged to have equality schemes or to carry out equality 
impact assessments, which were requirements of the now repealed race, disability 
and gender duties (Seery, 2011). The Specific Duties do not require the collection of 
information from employees, or their customers or users, on their race, religion or 
belief etc.; rather it is for the public sector bodies to demonstrate how they propose to 
meet their obligations under the PSED. Many public sector bodies collect data to 
enable them to comply with the PSED. In relation to caste there appears to be 
widespread agreement, however, that the collection of data on caste would be 
counter-productive (see also Dhanda et al, 2014b). 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the legal status of caste in British law. Section 97 of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 requires that caste be made ‘an aspect 
of race’ but it does not specify how this is to be done. A number of approaches are 
possible. Caste can be made an aspect of race via an existing sub-category of race 
such as ethnic origins; this can be termed the interpretative approach. Alternatively, 
caste can be made an aspect of race as an independent sub-category; this can be 
termed the iterative approach, in which caste is expressly iterated or named as a fifth 
sub-category under race.  
 
Although it has been ruled by the Employment Tribunal in one case that caste is 
already incorporated within the protected characteristic of race, the interpretative 
approach is at present not established. A lower court or tribunal decision is not 
binding precedent, consistency of outcome in future cases would not be guaranteed, 
and the principle will remain somewhat precarious. Even a binding precedent can be 
overturned until a decision is made at the Supreme Court. A successful argument 
that caste is a subset of race as currently defined might in time result in a body of 
caselaw emerging, such that caste will simply become treated in Britain as another 
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aspect of race, both sociologically and in law. Nevertheless, the introduction of the 
statutory prohibition of caste discrimination will simplify the process of dealing with 
caste discrimination claims, reducing costs and providing legal certainty (Waughray, 
2013).  
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3.  Caste in international law and other jurisdictions 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the experience of caste outside Britain with a number of 
aims. It first seeks to describe the critical developments in international law which 
saw caste discrimination declared as a form of descent-based discrimination and 
therefore a form of racial discrimination, and as such a violation of international 
human rights law. In this regard, it will chart the emergence and location of 
international prohibitions on caste discrimination. Second, it will look at the extent to 
which caste is a ground for non-discrimination in the legal jurisdictions of other 
States, focusing on constitutional protections in which caste is a named ground in 
non-discrimination clauses. Third, it will highlight the experience of India as the 
paradigmatic example of domestic caste discrimination legislation through the 1950 
Indian Constitution. Fourth, it will chart the relevance of the international examples 
for the current proposals to legislate against caste discrimination in Britain, including 
the impact on the proposed sunset clause. In conclusion, the chapter will highlight 
the mandate provided by international human rights law for the current legislation 
and how its interpretation ought to be subject to the parameters set out in key 
international documents. 
 
3.2  International human rights law and ‘descent’ 
The word ‘caste’ does not appear in any international treaty. India did propose its 
inclusion in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 
1948, but dropped the idea when it was pointed out that ‘caste’ could be read into 
other grounds in the UDHR non-discrimination clause, notably ‘birth’. Subsequently, 
the issue of caste became dormant and re-emerged only in 1996 in the context of a 
State Report by India to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), which monitors the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination 1965 (ICERD). In this session, CERD interpreted the 
meaning of ‘descent’, one of five grounds in the definition of racial discrimination 
(race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin) in Article 1(1) ICERD, to include 
caste. This did not occur in a vacuum, but was the result of a long period of lobbying 
by various Dalit organisations to have international recognition that the Indian 
Constitution had not eliminated de facto caste discrimination, and that caste was an 
international as well as a national problem.  
 
The identification of caste as a form of descent-based discrimination had a layered 
rationale. Firstly, it was a practical approach, in that descent was considered the 
ground in the definition of racial discrimination under which caste best fit. Secondly, 
the drafting history of the treaty, or travaux préparatoires, indicated that India had in 
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fact suggested the inclusion of the word ‘descent’ as one of the five grounds. This 
led the Committee to surmise that India must have meant caste when proffering 
descent, although this is contested (Keane, 2007; Waughray, 2013). Finally, the 
Committee did not wish to target India, or be seen to be doing so, and descent-
based discrimination afforded it the means to broaden the discussion to groups 
outside the Indian caste structure and draw in other communities in other States who 
were suffering from analogous systems of inherited dehumanisation. For example, 
the Buraku community in Japan were quickly subsumed under the descent-based 
discrimination movement.  
 
CERD subsequently began a process of investigating whether descent-based 
discrimination can be found in other States Parties to the treaty. It has questioned 
among other States Bangladesh, Nepal, Senegal, Ghana, Mali and the Yemen, for 
the existence of caste or descent-based groups who suffer from discrimination. In 
view of the internationalisation of caste and descent, the Committee drafted General 
Recommendation 29 on Descent-based Discrimination which set out its 
understanding of descent-based discrimination. The legal status of a General 
Recommendation is not settled; but they are usually considered authoritative 
interpretations, and UN treaty bodies will consistently refer to them as required 
standards for State adherence to treaty obligations. It is important to note that while 
broader than caste, the concept of descent-based discrimination is not without limits, 
and General Recommendation 29 provides a guide as to the types of discrimination 
subsumed by the concept. It is essentially an international reading of caste, broader 
than the South Asian paradigm, but confined to practices which involve 
discrimination on the basis of caste-like structures. 
 
General Recommendation 29 also implicitly delineates who is not covered; it is not 
concerned with types of discrimination on the basis of class, or ethnic groups such 
as the Roma (the subject of another, separate General Recommendation), focussing 
instead on an international understanding of caste hierarchies as a form of descent-
based discrimination. It includes a cogent but lengthy definition-type description, 
which requires States Parties to take: 
 
Steps to identify those descent-based communities under their jurisdiction 
who suffer from discrimination, especially on the basis of caste and 
analogous systems of inherited status, and whose existence may be 
recognized on the basis of various factors including some or all of the 
following: inability or restricted ability to alter inherited status; socially 
enforced restrictions on marriage outside the community; private and 
public segregation, including in housing and education, access to public 
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spaces, places of worship and public sources of food and water; limitation 
of freedom to renounce inherited occupations or degrading or hazardous 
work; subjection to debt bondage; subjection to dehumanizing discourses 
referring to pollution or untouchability; and generalized lack of respect for 
their human dignity and equality. 
 
This is a distinct form of discrimination in which the international understanding ties 
closely with the experience of caste discrimination in South Asia, but is of clear 
relevance outside that context too.  
 
The movement against descent-based discrimination has seen some States oppose 
CERD’s interpretation, with India and Japan in particular arguing that caste is not a 
form of racial discrimination as interpreted by the Committee. Nepal, by contrast, has 
readily reported on caste discrimination to CERD, evidently considering it to fall 
clearly within the Committee’s remit. Furthermore, the CERD approach has found 
consistent support within the UN structures and mechanisms, including the 
appointment of UN Special Rapporteurs on discrimination based on work and 
descent, and thus caste and descent-based discrimination as a global practice are 
affirmed within the international human rights architecture (Keane, 2007).  
 
From a terminological viewpoint, the term ‘descent-based discrimination’ is broader 
than, but includes, caste, and as such, the Committee investigates caste structures 
in many States beyond South Asia. Much of this work is in its early stages, factoring 
in the slow-moving nature of international human rights law. The Committee will ask 
a State to provide details on certain groups who may be experiencing descent-based 
discrimination – such as the al-Akhdam in Yemen – and require the State to report 
back, upon which further questioning will occur as to whether legal measures are 
needed to eliminate discrimination against such groups.  
 
Overall, the movement against caste discrimination in international human rights law 
through the targeting of descent is relatively recent and its effect, as well as State 
responses, is still being distilled. It is apparent however that caste discrimination 
among diaspora communities is firmly part of treaty obligations under ICERD. It is 
notable that the Special Rapporteurs identified caste discrimination among diaspora 
communities as indicative of the global nature of descent-based discrimination, with 
one report concentrated solely on this question (Eide and Yokota, 2004). In its 
response to the most recent State Report of the UK to CERD (2011), the Committee 
cited information from NGOs on caste discrimination in the UK, and concluded:  
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Recalling its previous concluding observations and its general 
recommendation No. 29 (2002) on descent, the Committee recommends 
that the Minister responsible in the State party invoke section 9(5)(a) of 
the Equality Act 2010 to provide for 'caste to be an aspect of race' in order 
to provide remedies to victims of this form of discrimination. The 
Committee further requests the State party to inform the Committee of 
developments on this matter in its next periodic report.  
 
Therefore the statutory provision requiring caste to be added to the Equality Act 
2010 is consistent with CERD’s General Recommendation that State parties enact 
legislation to outlaw discrimination based on descent, and with CERD’s 2012 
recommendations to the UK. This point was echoed in a recent address to the 
House of Lords by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, who 
called for ‘strong, swift implementation by the UK government of its new legal 
obligation [a reference to section 97 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013] to extend the reach of the UK’s equality legislation…to cover caste-based 
discrimination’ (Pillay, 2013).  
 
3.3  Caste in the legal jurisdictions of other States 
India is the paradigmatic example of caste as a ground for non-discrimination within 
the domestic legal system or constitutional order of other States. However, there are 
a number of other examples. Firstly, within South Asia, there are a number of States 
with caste as a ground for non-discrimination. Thus the Constitution of Bangladesh 
forbids discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth 
(Article 28). The Constitution of Pakistan includes caste as a ground for non-
discrimination in access to educational institutions (Article 22), public places (Article 
26) and services (Article 27). The Constitution of Sri Lanka lists caste alongside 
race, religion, language, sex, political opinion and place of birth (Article 12(2)), as 
well as forbidding restrictions on access to shops, restaurants and places of public 
worship and other services, on the ground inter alia of caste (Article 12(3)). The 
Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 offers extensive provisions on caste, largely 
drawn from the example of India. However, it remains a contested text with little 
indication of what provisions will remain at the end of the constitutional process. 
Nepal’s status is rare as the only State to have formally institutionalised a legal caste 
system in its foundational texts, with the caste hierarchy cemented through the 
Muluki Ain of 1854, a foundational legal text that regulated public and private law and 
protected social and religious values along caste divisions. The current Interim 
Constitution thus has many references to caste and untouchability, and support for 
their abolition. Overall, within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 
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the regional grouping, provisions on caste are only absent from the constitutions of 
the Maldives and Bhutan. 
 
Outside South Asia, there are a handful of examples. Article 16(3) of the 1968 
Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius describes ‘discriminatory’ as affording 
different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their 
respective descriptions by caste and a number of other grounds such as race. The 
most isolated example, geographically, is the State of Yap in the Federated States of 
Micronesia, which has a recognised and complex caste system. The 1982 Yap State 
Constitution provides leadership roles to groups who have been historically 
excluded, including lower castes. In West Africa, which is strongly associated with 
descent-based discrimination by CERD, the Constitution of Burkina Faso includes 
caste in its non-discrimination clause grounds in Article 1, as well as including caste 
in a clause on non-discrimination in marriage and family life in Article 23. No other 
West African state has a constitutional or statutory reference to caste. There are no 
references to caste in the constitutions of Canada, Fiji or South Africa, all States with 
large South Asian diaspora communities. 
 
3.4  Caste and India 
The Indian example remains the best known and the most significant in terms of law. 
It was India that first sought to address caste discrimination through law, and the 
1950 Indian Constitution is a pivotal document. It has four features in relation to the 
legal approach adopted. The first is the inclusion of caste as a ground for non-
discrimination, seen in the non-discrimination clauses in its Articles 15 and 16. The 
second is the abolition of untouchability, considered the worst effect of caste 
hierarchies, in its Article 17. The third is a system of reservations, or affirmative 
action policies, scattered across the document (and in its amendments) but grouped 
into three prongs: in education, public services and in electoral seats to the lower 
house and State legislatures. This combination of non-discrimination and affirmative 
action is a legal technique that is now standard within the tools of domestic and 
international law, but the Indian Constitution is the first founding document to 
undertake such an approach. The final feature is that the Constitution mandates the 
enactment into statutes of laws which tackle untouchability and hate crimes, known 
in India as atrocities, on the basis of caste.  
 
As a result, legislation has been introduced to protect Dalits from degrading and 
humiliating customs and employment practices, and from economic exploitation, for 
example manual scavenging. Untouchability practices and caste hate crimes are 
punishable under the Indian Penal Code or under special ‘hate crimes’ legislation. 
The Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955 defines certain acts as criminal offences if 
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committed because of Untouchability, while the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 prohibits specified acts, or hate crimes, 
where the victim (but not the perpetrator) is a Dalit or an Adivasi (see Section 1.3).  
 
There is no definition of caste or untouchability in the Constitution of India or in 
legislation (Waughray, 2013). ‘Scheduled Caste’ is the constitutional, legal and 
administrative term for Dalits in India. It is used to identify the beneficiaries of 
affirmative action and other legal and policy measures. The term refers to those 
formerly ‘Untouchable’ castes listed in a Schedule to the Constitution. Scheduled 
Castes are defined in the Constitution simply as those castes notified as such by 
Presidential Order. The Constitution contains no criteria for identifying the Scheduled 
Castes, but India’s Ministry for Social Justice and Empowerment gives the following 
administrative criteria: ‘extreme social, educational and economic backwardness 
arising out of traditional practice of Untouchability’. Scheduled Caste status is 
established by a Caste Certificate issued by the authorities attesting to the bearer’s 
membership of a Scheduled, or Untouchable, caste, thereby entitling them to the 
benefit of affirmative action policies and other legal and policy measures. Although 
context-specific, ‘Scheduled Caste’ has entered UK usage, for example, on 
matrimonial websites (Waughray, 2009).The original Schedule was drawn up by the 
British in India in 1936. It was incorporated into the Constitution of India in 1950 and 
has remained in use, little changed, ever since. In his seminal work on India’s 
reservations system, Marc Galanter explains that the basis for inclusion in the 
original colonial Schedule was ‘Untouchability’, ‘measured by the incidence of social 
disabilities’ accruing from ‘low social and ritual status in the traditional social 
hierarchy’ (Galanter, 1984: 122-35). There is no accepted test for ‘Untouchability’; in 
the 1930s the British tried to specify an all-India test for identifying Untouchable 
groups, but this proved impossible due to variations in regional practices (Galanter, 
1984). 
 
Definitions of caste and untouchability can be found in Indian caselaw. In the leading 
case of Indra Sawhney v Union of India [1993], the Indian Supreme Court defined 
caste as a socially homogenous class and also an occupational grouping, 
membership of which is involuntary and hereditary: ‘Lowlier the hereditary 
occupation, lowlier the social standing of the class in the graded hierarchy.’ Even 
where the individual does not follow that occupation, ‘still the label remains and his 
identity is not changed’. 
 
In Soosai v. Union of India [1985], Untouchability was characterised by the Supreme 
Court as involving deep and oppressively severe social and economic disabilities 
and cultural and educational backwardness and degradation, not mere material 
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deprivation. Significantly, the Court did not suggest that the concept and practice of 
Untouchability was restricted to Hinduism. Rather, the existence of Untouchability 
among non-Hindus was treated as a factual question, subject to a threshold test 
(Waughray, 2010). 
 
Despite widespread recognition that the ideology and practice of caste exists in other 
religions, the Indian constitutional framework treats it as a Hindu phenomenon. 
Under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, only Hindus, Sikhs or 
Buddhists can be classified as Scheduled Castes. Muslim and Christian Dalits are 
excluded on grounds of religion from the Scheduled Caste category and hence from 
accessing Scheduled Caste reservations. Lack of Scheduled Caste status also 
means that Muslim and Christian Dalits who are victims of caste hate crimes cannot 
file a criminal complaint as the victim must be a member of a Scheduled Caste for 
caste hate legislation to be triggered, a situation that has been criticised by the UN 
as well as by academics and activists within India and elsewhere (Waughray, 2010). 
 
3.5  Relevance of international examples 
While clearly the Indian and the UK experience of caste cannot be equated, legally, 
the non-discrimination clause technique is equally applicable and relevant. Similarly, 
caste appears as a ground for non-discrimination in Mauritius, where it has not had 
the same historical and social impact as in India. Thus caste could appear as a 
ground for non-discrimination under equality legislation in the UK, drawing on the 
Indian precedent, which is not a judgement as to the history or scale of caste 
discrimination in Britain. The differentiation in the legal orders is also discernable. 
India lists caste alongside race as a ground for non-discrimination, similar to the 
other South Asian States, which list caste in their constitutional texts alongside race, 
religion and other grounds. In the UK, the legislative duty under s.97 of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 is that caste be made an aspect of race, 
therefore subsuming it under this ground.  
 
ICERD distinguishes between racial discrimination and race, viewing race as one of 
five grounds which make-up the definition of racial discrimination. Hence caste and 
race can both be considered forms of racial discrimination for the purposes of the 
ICERD definition. If the UK were to follow the international approach, it would find 
caste as an attribute of racial discrimination, rather than race. However, in the UK, 
the term race maps closely to the international term ‘racial discrimination’. Therefore 
making caste an aspect of race within the Equality Act 2010 will contribute to a legal 
process begun in India, replicated in other jurisdictions, and continued at the 
international level, of including caste either as a named or as an interpreted ground 
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for non-discrimination. But this is not to equate the experience of caste across 
jurisdictions.  
 
There is a further point in relation to reservations or affirmative action that the Indian 
example provides, and which impacts upon the proposal to insert a ‘sunset clause’ 
into the proposed equality legislation in Britain. Section 97 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 provides for the possibility of review and repeal of the 
caste legislation after five years. The Indian system employs two types of legal 
techniques; non-discrimination and affirmative action through the reservations 
system, with the former cemented within the Indian legal system while the latter 
requires periodic renewal every ten years. As a result, the Indian constitution has a 
non-discrimination clause on caste (permanent) and reservations/affirmative action 
measures (temporary, renewed every 10 years). This is in line with every other 
equality text in the world, under which grounds for non-discrimination are immutable 
while affirmative action provisions, should there be any, are put in place for a period 
of time until the required equalisation process is complete. The proposed ‘sunset 
clause’ for a non-discrimination ground is legally without precedent and goes against 
this key differential. In law, affirmative action provisions are acknowledged as 
temporary but grounds for non-discrimination are always permanent, as reflected in 
the Indian Constitution in relation to caste. 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
Caste has been recognised by the UN as an international issue of concern which 
includes, but is not limited to, the South Asian experience. Caste as a ground for 
non-discrimination appears in the legal order of a number of States, largely in South 
Asia but also outside this region. Similarly, the question of diaspora communities has 
been specifically raised as part of the UN movement against descent-based 
discrimination. There are differences in terms of the experience of caste, as well as 
the legislative response, but broadly there is a mandate from ICERD, to which the 
UK is a State Party, to legislate for caste discrimination where the circumstances 
warrant. 
 
The understanding of descent-based discrimination seen in General 
Recommendation 29, including the types of groups and States considered to 
experience this form of discrimination, may provide guidance as to who could access 
the proposed UK legislative provisions. For example, in addition to Dalit and other 
communities, a member of the Buraku community or the al-Akhdam experiencing 
discrimination in the UK may fall within the ambit of the proposed legislative 
provision, given that these groups are considered by CERD to be within the sweep of 
descent-based discrimination. 
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4.  Conclusion  
 
4.1  Introduction  
This report has examined the issue of caste in Britain with a specific aim to establish 
the manner in which caste can be made an aspect of race for the purposes of the 
Equality Act 2010. The process of consultation with stakeholders (detailed in Dhanda 
et al, 2014b) has provided insights into how communities, experts, practitioners and 
victims, among others, have viewed the legislative proposals; these have informed 
the analysis throughout. Caste has long defied categorisation, and its manifestations 
in Britain are a source of continued analysis across disciplines and cultures. 
 
The report emphasises that the current state of the law is contested, with emerging 
judicial decision-making clouded by the absence of clear guidance on the status of 
caste within British law. It questions whether the existing law, as set out in the 
Equality Act 2010, is sufficient to engage with caste discrimination and provide 
judicial oversight and remedies. While situated in a national context, the report has 
also sought an international perspective, drawing on the experience of legislating for 
caste discrimination in other jurisdictions. It has similarly drawn on the precedents 
set at the international human rights level. It has located the present proposals within 
a wider international push towards greater legal recognition of caste discrimination, 
with the UK potentially providing a template that may be followed by other States.  
 
With this in mind, we conclude that implementing the statutory requirement that 
caste be made an aspect of race is a question of great import. It requires reflection 
as to how the law can respond to the complexity of caste in Britain, and provide 
sufficient flexibility to address the experience of victims, while ensuring clarity for 
those who will engage with the legal procedures.  
 
4.2  The legal formulation of caste as an aspect of race  
The report has sought precise answers as to the correct legal formulation of caste as 
an aspect of race, taking as its departure point that the legislative duty in section 97 
of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 reads only that caste be made an 
aspect of race, and does not specify how this is to be done. It has outlined the 
options available to legislators in this regard, weighing these against the experience 
or practice of caste as witnessed in a marginal group of specific cases, or in wider 
caselaw on aspects of race and religion or belief. The available pathways are an 
interpretative approach, whereby caste is read into existing subsets of race, in 
particular ethnic origins; or an iterative approach whereby caste is named as a fifth 
subset of race, additional to the four existing subsets. A further pathway is to employ 
the international term ‘descent’, although this option has been rejected by legislators; 
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descent already has its own meaning within UK equality legislation and it is a feature 
of caste but does not capture all the elements of caste. It does not appear as a 
statutory term in the UK, and the fear has been voiced that to introduce it as an 
express term could open the door to claims based on other grounds such as social 
class, which Parliament has rejected.  
 
The caselaw at present is divided as to whether caste can be read into ethnic 
origins. The report has outlined differences in kind between the concept of ethnicity 
and the concept of caste. Similarly, it has indicated the shortfall in other 
characteristics, notably religion or belief. Caste is a complex and evolving concept in 
Britain, and as such, it seems that the judicious path is to name caste as a fifth 
subset of race. This would provide legal clarity, situate caste within the Equality Act 
2010, and avoid complex and rebuttable interpretative arguments. 
 
The proposed “sunset clause” is without precedent in discrimination law. Specific 
timeframes are usually reserved for affirmative action policies rather than non-
discrimination clauses. The spirit of the Equality Act 2010 is to combat specific 
instances of discrimination as it arises, and generate attitudinal change. If caste 
discrimination is to recede, it ought nevertheless to remain within the ambit of the 
Equality Act 2010 to guard against future practices, rendering it congruent with the 
other characteristics and subsets within the legislation, and with the nature of 
equality and non-discrimination law.  
 
4.3  The definition of caste 
Currently there is no consensus on how a definition of caste should be formulated. 
The existing Equality Act Explanatory Notes on caste (2010) provided the first 
elaboration of caste in British equality law, although the text is now perceived as 
unsatisfactory by experts and stakeholders (see Dhanda et al, 2014b). Consequently 
there is a need to elaborate a new formulation or definition that more accurately 
reflects the experience of caste in Britain. The international experience is largely 
unhelpful, with the question of a definition sidestepped in other jurisdictions that have 
a legal engagement with caste. A starting point for a definition is provided by CERD 
General Recommendation 29, quoted above, but this document is of an international 
character and its formulation is consequently wide-ranging. 
 
The present report has explained both the complexity of caste and the need for 
separate treatment of caste in law, for example by way of express iteration of caste 
as an independent sub-category of race. We conclude that any definition – whether 
on the face of the Act or in the Explanatory Notes - ought to be expressive of caste in 
Britain and should draw on key terms. It needs to be sufficiently open to cover caste 
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as understood and experienced in Britain; it should delineate the boundaries of the 
category but should not be overly prescriptive. In this regard, it is suggested that the 
definition, whether forming part of the wording of the Act or its Explanatory Notes, 
could include the following elements: endogamy, social stratification, and (inherited) 
status and examples could be provided in the Explanatory Notes as is currently the 
case with race and religion. 
 
4.4  Future work 
There is a growing research community on caste in Britain, exploring its facets and 
manifestations. This is multi-disciplinary and asserts a variety of perspectives. Caste 
has a long legal history in a range of jurisdictions, and the present research in Britain 
is linked to the wider international study of caste discrimination. At the international 
level, the UN literature emphasises the indicative nature of its present standards, 
notably General Recommendation 29, which is exploratory in tone as it seeks more 
information on the nature of caste and descent-based discrimination as experienced 
by a number of States and regions, and the form and efficacy of legal remedies. 
 
Given the particular focus of the present report, it is perhaps appropriate to signal 
that the functioning of caste in the Equality Act 2010 will be played out in caselaw. At 
present, resources are being diverted in terms of legal analysis towards arguments 
as to how existing characteristics can be interpreted to include caste. With greater 
legal clarity provided by the legislative amendment, the focus will shift to how caste 
is manifested, the forms discrimination may take, and the experience of victims of 
caste discrimination.  
 
The present report is a contribution to an emerging area of discrimination law, 
outlining the context and legal pathways available to situate caste within the Equality 
Act 2010. It is intended to provide guidance as to the options available and generate 
discussion on potential legal pathways. The multi-layered experience of caste in 
Britain will emerge in the application of the Equality Act 2010, as more voices are 
added to this growing discourse. 
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This report reviews socio-legal research on British equality  
law and caste in the context of the requirement in the 
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